265 ideas
| 7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
| 9218 | Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider] |
| 2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 8828 | Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam] |
| 7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
| 18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
| 2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
| 18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
| 18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
| 13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
| 13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
| 18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
| 13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
| 13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
| 13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
| 13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
| 13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
| 13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
| 13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
| 13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
| 13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
| 18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
| 9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
| 13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
| 9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
| 18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
| 13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
| 13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
| 18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
| 10066 | Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
| 18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
| 13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
| 13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
| 13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
| 13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
| 13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
| 13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
| 13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
| 18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
| 13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
| 13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
| 14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
| 13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
| 9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
| 13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
| 13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
| 18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
| 18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
| 9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
| 9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
| 13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
| 3663 | How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam] |
| 9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
| 9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
| 9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
| 18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
| 8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
| 3534 | To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
| 2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
| 9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
| 17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
| 14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
| 7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
| 13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
| 13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
| 13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
| 18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
| 2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
| 18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
| 13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
| 13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
| 4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
| 13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
| 13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
| 18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
| 2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
| 2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
| 2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
| 2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
| 7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
| 2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
| 2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
| 4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
| 12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
| 3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
| 14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
| 2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
| 7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
| 2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
| 2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
| 2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
| 2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
| 14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
| 9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
| 14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
| 2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
| 3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
| 11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| 2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
| 11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
| 11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |
| 5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |