Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Samuel Scheffler, Clive Bell and G.E. Moore

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Good art produces exaltation and detachment [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beauty' leads to confusion, because it denotes distinct emotions [Bell,C]
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
We only see landscapes as artistic if we ignore their instrumental value [Bell,C]
Our feeling for natural beauty is different from the aesthetic emotion of art [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Visual form can create a sublime mental state [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Aestheticism invites artist to create beauty, but with no indication of how to do it [Bell,C]
Art is the expression of an emotion for ultimate reality [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Only artists can discern significant form; other people must look to art to find it [Bell,C, by Gardner]
Maybe significant form gives us a feeling for ultimate reality [Bell,C]
Significant form is the essence of art, which I believe expresses an emotion about reality [Bell,C]
'Form' is visual relations, and it is 'significant' if it moves us aesthetically; art needs both [Bell,C, by Feagin]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
The only expression art could have is the emotion resulting from pure form [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
Mere copies of pictures are not significant - unless the copies are very exact [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Art is distinguished by its aesthetic emotion, which produces appropriate form [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Aesthetic experience is an exaltation which increases the possibilities of life [Bell,C]
Aesthetic contemplation is the best and most intense mental state [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Only artistic qualities matter in art, because they also have the highest moral value [Bell,C]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
If the aim is good outcomes, why are killings worse than deaths? [Scheffler, by Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion sees infinite value in some things, and irrelevance in the rest [Bell,C]