Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Samuel Scheffler, Robert Fogelin and John L. Pollock

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
If the aim is good outcomes, why are killings worse than deaths? [Scheffler, by Foot]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]