66 ideas
7500 | Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault] |
15045 | The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault] |
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
15038 | Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault] |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
21945 | Foucault originally felt that liberating reason had become an instrument of domination [Foucault, by Gutting] |
15044 | 'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault] |
15042 | Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
18189 | ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
15037 | Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
21942 | Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
21941 | Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
22235 | Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
21939 | The author function of any text is a plurality of selves [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
7501 | Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault] |
7498 | Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault] |
21940 | Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault] |
15043 | Every society has a politics of truth, concerning its values, functions, prestige and mechanisms [Foucault] |
15040 | Marxists denounced power as class domination, but never analysed its mechanics [Foucault] |
15041 | Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault] |
8991 | Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton] |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
22236 | The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault] |
21947 | Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting] |
21946 | Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |
21116 | Power is used to create identities and ways of life for other people [Foucault, by Shorten] |
15039 | History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault] |