Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Scott Soames, Richard L. Kirkham and Jennifer Hornsby

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18369 There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19320 If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
19315 In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
19317 An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
19322 Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
13965 Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
13964 Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying
20082 Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]