14 ideas
15382 | Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |