Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Seneca the Younger, Tim Crane and Bernard Linsky

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106 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca]
Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca]
What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane]
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca]
Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca]
It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca]
A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca]
Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca]
Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca]
Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca]
Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca]
Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca]
Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca]
There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca]
If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca]
Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca]
If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca]
Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane]