Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Sextus Empiricus, R Keefe / P Smith and Stoic school

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


181 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men participate in politics, especially if it shows moral progress [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
Wise men are never astonished at things which other people take to be wonders [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wise man has yet been discovered [Stoic school, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Stoic physics concerns cosmos, elements and causes (with six detailed divisions) [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Ethics studies impulse, good, passion, virtue, goals, value, action, appropriateness, encouragement [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
True philosophising is not memorising ideas, but living by them [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Some facts are indispensable for an effect, and others actually necessitate the effect [Stoic school, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The Stoics distinguished spoken logos from logos within the mind [Stoic school, by Plotinus]
Stoics study canons, criteria and definitions, in order to find the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Stoics believed that rational capacity in man (logos) is embodied in the universe [Stoic school, by Long]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectics is mastery of question and answer form [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Falsehoods corrupt a mind, producing passions and instability [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Stoics like syllogisms, for showing what is demonstrative, which corrects opinions [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Stoics avoided universals by paraphrasing 'Man is...' as 'If something is a man, then it is...' [Stoic school, by Long]
'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
Stoics applied bivalence to sorites situations, so everyone is either vicious or wholly virtuous [Stoic school, by Williamson]
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics have four primary categories: substrates, qualities, dispositions, relative dispositions [Stoic school, by Simplicius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic Forms are just our thoughts [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Stoics say matter has qualities, and substance underlies it, with no form or qualities [Stoic school, by Chalcidius]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school]
How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school]
Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
A proposition is possible if it is true when nothing stops it being true [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are false if the falsehood of the conclusion does not conflict with the antecedent [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is a secure grasp of presentations which cannot be reversed by argument [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Two sorts of opinion: either poorly grounded belief, or weak belief [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
There are non-sensible presentations, which come to us through the intellect [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
Stoics say we are born like a blank sheet of paper; the first concepts on it are sensations [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
At birth the soul is a blank sheet ready to be written on [Stoic school, by Aetius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus]
Stoic perception is a presentation to which one voluntarily assents [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
For Stoics knowledge is an assertion which never deviates from the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Eight parts of the soul: five senses, seeds, speech and reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Division of the soul divides a person, reducing responsibility for the nonrational part [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
Stoics say the soul is a mixture of air and fire [Stoic school, by Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our conceptions arise from experience, similarity, analogy, transposition, composition and opposition [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
For Stoics the true self is defined by what I can be master of [Stoic school, by Foucault]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Stoics expanded the idea of compulsion, and contracted what counts as one's own actions [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The free will problem was invented by the Stoics [Stoic school, by Berlin]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The nearest to ancient determinism is Stoic fate, but that is controlled by a sympathetic God [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Stoics classify passions according to the opinion of good and bad which they imply [Stoic school, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are four basic emotions: pleasure or delight, distress, appetite, and fear [Stoic school, by Cicero]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth [Stoic school, by Fogelin]
If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are incomplete 'lekta' [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric has three types, four modes, and four sections [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Earlier Stoics speak of assent, but not of choice, let alone of a will [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Stoics said responsibility depends on rationality [Stoic school, by Sorabji]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics use 'kalon' (beautiful) as a synonym for 'agathon' (good) [Bury on Stoic school]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Stoics say that folly alone is evil [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Prime values apply to the life in agreement; useful values apply to the natural life [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
The appraiser's value is what is set by someone experienced in the facts [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The goal is to live consistently with the constitution of a human being [Stoic school, by Clement]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Stoics said health is an 'indifferent', but they still considered it preferable [Stoic school, by Pormann]
The health of the soul is a good blend of beliefs [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Stoic morality says that one's own happiness will lead to impartiality [Stoic school, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous men do not feel sexual desire, which merely focuses on physical beauty [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Stoicism was an elitist option to lead a beautiful life [Stoic school, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Final goods: confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment and no pain, good spirits, virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness for the Stoics was an equable flow of life [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the end and goal, achieved by living virtuously, in agreement, and according to nature [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Stoics say pleasure is at most a byproduct of finding what is suitable for us [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Rapture is a breakdown of virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
If humans are citizens of the world (not just a state) then virtue is all good human habits [Stoic school, by Mautner]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
An appropriate action is one that can be defended, perhaps by its consistency. [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour is just, courageous, orderly or knowledgeable. It is praiseworthy, or functions well [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
The Stoics rejected entirely the high value that had been placed on contemplation [Stoic school, by Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Stoics do not despise external goods, but subject them to reason, and not to desire [Taylor,R on Stoic school]
Crafts like music and letters are virtuous conditions, and they accord with virtue [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
For Stoics, obligations are determined by social role [Taylor,R on Stoic school]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is distinguished by knowing conditional truths, because impressions are connected [Stoic school, by Long]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
Stoics favour a mixture of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
The Stoics saw the whole world as a city [Stoic school, by Long]
The best government blends democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Stoics originated the concept of natural law, as agreed correct reasoning [Stoic school, by Annas]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Stoics say a wise man will commit suicide if he has a good enough reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Suicide is reasonable, for one's country or friends, or because of very bad health [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Stoic 'nature' is deterministic, physical and teleological [Stoic school, by Annas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Unlike Epicurus, Stoics distinguish the Whole from the All, with the latter including the void [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus]
Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus]
A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus]
If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus]
Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus]
How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus]
If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The cosmos is regularly consumed and reorganised by the primary fire [Stoic school, by Aristocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Early Stoics called the logos 'god', meaning not a being, but the principle of the universe [Stoic school]
All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus]
How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus]
God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus]
God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus]
The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Stoics say god is matter, or an inseparable quality of it, or is the power within it [Stoic school, by Chalcidius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus]
An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Virtuous souls endure till the end, foolish souls for a short time, animal souls not at all [Stoic school, by Eusebius]
Stoics say virtuous souls last till everything ends in fire, but foolish ones fade away [Stoic school, by ]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus]