Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Shaughan Lavine, Alexis de Tocqueville and Frank P. Ramsey

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71 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Second-order set theory just adds a version of Replacement that quantifies over functions [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
An 'upper bound' is the greatest member of a subset; there may be several of these, so there is a 'least' one [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
Collections of things can't be too big, but collections by a rule seem unlimited in size [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Those who reject infinite collections also want to reject the Axiom of Choice [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
The Power Set is just the collection of functions from one collection to another [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement was immediately accepted, despite having very few implications [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Foundation says descending chains are of finite length, blocking circularity, or ungrounded sets [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Pure collections of things obey Choice, but collections defined by a rule may not [Lavine]
The controversy was not about the Axiom of Choice, but about functions as arbitrary, or given by rules [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
The 'logical' notion of class has some kind of definition or rule to characterise the class [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception of set wasn't suggested until 1947 [Lavine]
The iterative conception needs the Axiom of Infinity, to show how far we can iterate [Lavine]
The iterative conception doesn't unify the axioms, and has had little impact on mathematical proofs [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size: if it's the same size as a set, it's a set; it uses Replacement [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
A collection is 'well-ordered' if there is a least element, and all of its successors can be identified [Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic presupposes a set of relations already fixed by the first-order domain [Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Mathematical proof by contradiction needs the law of excluded middle [Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is nowadays (thanks to set theory) regarded as the study of structure, not of quantity [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Every rational number, unlike every natural number, is divisible by some other number [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
For the real numbers to form a set, we need the Continuum Hypothesis to be true [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Cauchy gave a necessary condition for the convergence of a sequence [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
The two sides of the Cut are, roughly, the bounding commensurable ratios [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting results in well-ordering, and well-ordering makes counting possible [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
The theory of infinity must rest on our inability to distinguish between very large sizes [Lavine]
The infinite is extrapolation from the experience of indefinitely large size [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
The intuitionist endorses only the potential infinite [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
'Aleph-0' is cardinality of the naturals, 'aleph-1' the next cardinal, 'aleph-ω' the ω-th cardinal [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Ordinals are basic to Cantor's transfinite, to count the sets [Lavine]
Paradox: the class of all ordinals is well-ordered, so must have an ordinal as type - giving a bigger ordinal [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Paradox: there is no largest cardinal, but the class of everything seems to be the largest [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory will found all of mathematics - except for the notion of proof [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Modern mathematics works up to isomorphism, and doesn't care what things 'really are' [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism rejects set-theory to found mathematics [Lavine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Wherever there is a small community, the association of the people is natural [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The people are just individuals, and only present themselves as united to foreigners [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
Vast empires are bad for well-being and freedom, though they may promote glory [Tocqueville]
People would be much happier and freer in small nations [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
In American judges rule according to the Constitution, not the law [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A monarchical family is always deeply concerned with the interests of the state [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Despots like to see their own regulations ignored, by themselves and their agents [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Aristocracy is constituted by inherited landed property [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
In Europe it is thought that local government is best handled centrally [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
An election, and its lead up time, are always a national crisis [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Universal suffrage is no guarantee of wise choices [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery undermines the morals and energy of a society [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
The liberty of the press is more valuable for what it prevents than what it promotes [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equality can only be established by equal rights for all (or no rights for anyone) [Tocqueville]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]
All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]