108 ideas
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| 19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
| 19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
| 19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
| 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 22744 | Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22748 | Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 22746 | If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
| 22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22747 | A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22749 | Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22750 | Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22742 | Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22751 | If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22730 | All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22739 | God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22738 | The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22734 | God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22736 | God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22740 | God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22735 | The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22732 | The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22728 | Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22737 | An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |
| 22731 | It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |