25 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
20716 | False prophets will perform wonders to deceive even the elect [Mark] |