Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen Hetherington, Robin F. Hendry and Jan Westerhoff

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]