110 ideas
| 9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
| 3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
| 9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
| 3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
| 12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
| 12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
| 12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
| 9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
| 12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
| 14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
| 14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
| 14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
| 14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
| 14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
| 14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
| 14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
| 12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
| 9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
| 14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
| 14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
| 14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
| 14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
| 12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
| 14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
| 14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
| 14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
| 14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
| 14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
| 14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
| 14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
| 14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
| 14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
| 14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
| 9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
| 18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
| 12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
| 12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
| 12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
| 12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
| 12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
| 12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
| 14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
| 12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
| 12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
| 12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
| 3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
| 18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
| 18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
| 18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
| 12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
| 14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
| 14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
| 3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
| 12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
| 12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
| 12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
| 14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
| 14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
| 14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
| 3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
| 3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
| 3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
| 3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
| 3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
| 12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
| 12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
| 14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
| 19068 | Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford] |
| 9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
| 9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
| 9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
| 14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
| 9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
| 14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
| 14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
| 9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
| 9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
| 14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
| 9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
| 9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
| 9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
| 9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
| 14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
| 9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
| 14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
| 9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
| 12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |
| 9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
| 9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
| 9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |