Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen Mumford, Stanislaw Lesniewski and Simone Weil

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181 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil]
Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil]
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil]
We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil]
The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
When we admire a work, we see ourselves as its creator [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Those who say immorality is not an aesthetic criterion must show that all criteria are aesthetic [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil]
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil]
We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil]
We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil]
Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
People in power always try to increase their power [Weil]
In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil]
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil]
After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil]
We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil]
It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
Once money is the main aim, society needs everyone to think wealth is possible [Weil]
The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil]
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil]
People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil]
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil]
Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil]
The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil]
Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil]
Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil]
Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Dividing history books into separate chapters is disastrous [Weil]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil]
The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The cruelty of the Old Testament put me off Christianity [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
I attach little importance to immortality, which is an undecidable fact, and irrelevant to us [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]