Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen Mumford, Thomas Jefferson and Baron de Montesquieu

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127 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu]
Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu]
People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu]
In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
Men are created equal, and with certain inalienable rights [Jefferson]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu]
The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu]
Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu]
Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu]
In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu]
In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu]
Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu]
Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu]
Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu]
The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu]
Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu]
Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu]
A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu]
It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu]
Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu]
All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu]
A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu]
Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu]
The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu]
Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu]
Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu]
Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu]
If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu]
Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu]
Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu]
French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu]
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]