Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen P. Schwartz, Francisco Surez and R Feldman / E Conee

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
5831 The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16665 There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
16666 A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16667 Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16780 Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
16758 The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16743 We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
13074 Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16742 We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
22149 Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
8808 Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
8807 Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
8809 Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8810 If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5826 The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
7563 The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
16682 Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]