Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen P. Stich, George Molnar and Carlo Rovelli

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]
Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]