68 ideas
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
| 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| 19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
| 19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
| 19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
| 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| 14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 23217 | All of our happiness and misery arises entirely from the brain [Hippocrates] |
| 10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |