34 ideas
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
7508 | Good reductionism connects fields of knowledge, but doesn't replace one with another [Pinker] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
7510 | Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker] |
7513 | Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
7509 | Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
7511 | Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker] |
7512 | There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
7505 | Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker] |
22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
7516 | In 1828, the stuff of life was shown to be ordinary chemistry, not a magic gel [Pinker] |
7515 | All the evidence says evolution is cruel and wasteful, not intelligent [Pinker] |
7514 | Intelligent Design says that every unexplained phenomenon must be design, by default [Pinker] |
5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |