82 ideas
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| 20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
| 20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
| 13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
| 13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
| 14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
| 17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
| 17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
| 17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
| 17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 7508 | Good reductionism connects fields of knowledge, but doesn't replace one with another [Pinker] |
| 17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
| 13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
| 14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
| 14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
| 13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| 14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
| 13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| 14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
| 13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
| 14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
| 13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
| 13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
| 14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
| 13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 7510 | Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker] |
| 7513 | Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 7509 | Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker] |
| 7511 | Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker] |
| 7512 | There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
| 20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
| 20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
| 20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
| 20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
| 20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
| 20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
| 20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
| 20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
| 20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
| 20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
| 20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
| 20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
| 20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
| 20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
| 20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
| 20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
| 22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
| 22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
| 22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
| 22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
| 7505 | Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker] |
| 14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
| 13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
| 13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
| 13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |
| 7516 | In 1828, the stuff of life was shown to be ordinary chemistry, not a magic gel [Pinker] |
| 7515 | All the evidence says evolution is cruel and wasteful, not intelligent [Pinker] |
| 7514 | Intelligent Design says that every unexplained phenomenon must be design, by default [Pinker] |