31 ideas
| 14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
| 14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
| 14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
| 14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
| 14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
| 3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |