114 ideas
21405 | Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long] |
20871 | Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero] |
5893 | A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero] |
5891 | Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero] |
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
21677 | How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero] |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
18091 | Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities [Berkeley] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
5879 | The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
5884 | How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero] |
5887 | The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
5886 | Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
6029 | Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero] |
2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
5885 | Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero] |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
21667 | Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero] |
20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
21678 | If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero] |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
5890 | We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero] |
5894 | All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero] |
6031 | The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero] |
5895 | If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero] |
2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |
2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |
2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |