Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stilpo, John Locke and John Stuart Mill

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389 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposition to reason is mad [Locke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke]
It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke]
If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke]
Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill]
Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke]
Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer]
If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill]
Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill]
There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill]
Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill]
Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill]
'2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill]
3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill]
Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill]
We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill]
Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill]
12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill]
Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existences can only be known by experience [Locke]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke]
If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke]
Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke]
We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke]
Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke]
Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke]
If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke]
Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke]
General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke]
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley]
If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke]
A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke]
Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke]
The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke]
The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke]
We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke]
Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley]
Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke]
Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke]
In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil]
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke]
The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke]
Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke]
Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill]
Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke]
The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke]
The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke]
General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke]
'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke]
My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Nothing about me is essential [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke]
A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke]
The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke]
Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke]
Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke]
General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill]
The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke]
Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke]
Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke]
We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill]
The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill]
Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill]
Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill]
Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill]
Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill]
Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke]
We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke]
Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton]
A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke]
If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke]
A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke]
The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke]
You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke]
Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill]
The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke]
Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke]
People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke]
Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke]
Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke]
If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke]
People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill]
The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Mill, by Wolff,J]
Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke]
Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke]
If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J]
Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill]
True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill]
Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill]
Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill]
Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill]
Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
All value depends on the labour involved [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke]
There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke]
Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin]
Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke]
A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke]
If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke]
Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke]
Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke]
Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke]
It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke]
Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke]
Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke]
Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke]
Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P]
The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke]
We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke]
Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P]
An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill]
Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill]
No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill]
Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill]
Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill]
Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill]