45 ideas
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
| 10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
| 10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
| 10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
| 10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
| 10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
| 10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
| 10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
| 10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
| 10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
| 10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
| 10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
| 10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
| 10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
| 10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
| 10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
| 10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
| 10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |