Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Susan A. Gelman, Samir Okasha and Albert Einstein

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53 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo]
Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein]