Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Thales, B Russell/AN Whitehead and Alexander Miller

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
1597 Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9542 The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21720 Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10044 Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
18208 We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
8204 Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead]
9359 Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
21707 Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
10036 In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
18248 A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
18152 Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
10025 Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes]
8683 Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
10037 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10093 The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman]
8691 The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10305 In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
8684 Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
8746 To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12033 An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
3013 Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
10040 Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
21725 The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
23474 A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead]
23455 The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead]
23480 The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
18275 Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
23453 Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
1494 Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
1713 Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
1742 Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]