367 ideas
| 23889 | Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil] |
| 23881 | All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil] |
| 9218 | Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider] |
| 23885 | Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil] |
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 23886 | Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 23884 | Truth is a value of thought [Weil] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 23755 | Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil] |
| 23877 | Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil] |
| 23825 | We seek truth only because it is good [Weil] |
| 23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
| 13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
| 13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
| 13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
| 13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
| 13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
| 13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
| 13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
| 13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
| 13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
| 18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
| 18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
| 13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
| 13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
| 13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
| 13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
| 13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
| 13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
| 13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
| 13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
| 13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
| 13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
| 13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
| 13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
| 13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
| 13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
| 18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
| 13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| 13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
| 13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
| 13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
| 13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
| 17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
| 18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
| 8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
| 4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
| 18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
| 8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
| 4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
| 18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
| 14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
| 17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
| 17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
| 17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
| 18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
| 18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| 8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| 4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
| 17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
| 8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
| 8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
| 8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
| 4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
| 8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
| 4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
| 4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
| 4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
| 4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
| 18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
| 4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
| 4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
| 17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
| 13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
| 13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
| 13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
| 15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| 23900 | Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil] |
| 13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| 13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 23888 | Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil] |
| 6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
| 17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
| 17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
| 17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
| 23747 | What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 23756 | The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil] |
| 17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| 18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
| 18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 23878 | Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil] |
| 23899 | The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil] |
| 23832 | We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil] |
| 23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
| 23758 | Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil] |
| 23887 | Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil] |
| 23903 | When we admire a work, we see ourselves as its creator [Weil] |
| 23898 | Those who say immorality is not an aesthetic criterion must show that all criteria are aesthetic [Weil] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23826 | Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil] |
| 23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
| 23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
| 23879 | In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil] |
| 23882 | Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil] |
| 23760 | All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil] |
| 23883 | Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil] |
| 23748 | The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil] |
| 23759 | Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil] |
| 23762 | Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil] |
| 23808 | There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil] |
| 23833 | The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil] |
| 23865 | Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil] |
| 23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
| 23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
| 23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
| 23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |
| 23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
| 23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
| 23834 | Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil] |
| 23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
| 23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
| 23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
| 23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
| 23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
| 23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
| 23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
| 23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
| 23857 | People in power always try to increase their power [Weil] |
| 23866 | In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil] |
| 23812 | Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil] |
| 23831 | The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil] |
| 23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
| 23871 | No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil] |
| 23856 | Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil] |
| 23867 | After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil] |
| 23830 | A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil] |
| 23870 | Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil] |
| 23809 | Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil] |
| 23829 | National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil] |
| 23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
| 23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
| 23859 | True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil] |
| 23863 | Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil] |
| 23869 | In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil] |
| 23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
| 23750 | It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil] |
| 23807 | The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil] |
| 23749 | The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil] |
| 23861 | Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil] |
| 23897 | Once money is the main aim, society needs everyone to think wealth is possible [Weil] |
| 23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
| 23828 | National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil] |
| 23810 | Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil] |
| 23811 | If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil] |
| 23868 | The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil] |
| 23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
| 23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
| 23901 | Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil] |
| 23753 | People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil] |
| 23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
| 23864 | Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil] |
| 23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
| 23751 | Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil] |
| 23752 | Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil] |
| 23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
| 23813 | Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil] |
| 23757 | The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil] |
| 23761 | Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil] |
| 23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
| 23764 | The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil] |
| 23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
| 23763 | Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil] |
| 23827 | Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil] |
| 23880 | When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil] |
| 23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
| 23858 | War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil] |
| 23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
| 23873 | Dividing history books into separate chapters is disastrous [Weil] |
| 23860 | Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil] |
| 17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
| 17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
| 18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
| 17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
| 17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
| 17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
| 8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
| 8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
| 18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
| 23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |
| 23754 | The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil] |
| 23892 | The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil] |
| 23904 | The cruelty of the Old Testament put me off Christianity [Weil] |
| 23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |
| 23902 | I attach little importance to immortality, which is an undecidable fact, and irrelevant to us [Weil] |
| 23765 | The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil] |