Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theodosius, Carrie Jenkins and C. Anthony Anderson

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
17729 Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18763 Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
18771 Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17730 Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17719 Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
17717 Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17724 It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
18769 Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17727 We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17720 There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18770 We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
17728 The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18765 Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
18764 The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
17726 Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
17734 It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
17723 Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
1799 If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17739 The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
17718 Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
17731 Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
17732 Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
17725 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]