Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theodosius, Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C and Irving M. Copi

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

20 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12312 The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10937 Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12308 In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
12303 Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
1799 If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12307 Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
12310 Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]