Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theophrastus, Verity Harte and Peter Unger

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14 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]