Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Thomas Grundmann, Charles Darwin and Alvin I. Goldman

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
4262 If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
4045 Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
4044 Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
4048 Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
4043 Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
4049 The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
4047 Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8830 A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
6871 We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
6872 Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
6874 Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
8832 If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8829 Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
6875 Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
16861 A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
8831 Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]