Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Thomas M. Crisp, George Engelbretsen and Tuomas E. Tahko

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25 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18915 If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
18919 There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
14025 The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14023 The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14024 Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18913 Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
18907 Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18912 Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18922 Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
18905 Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18908 Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18917 Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18916 Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
18921 Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14021 Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16978 If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16975 Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
18918 Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
18920 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
18906 Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
16976 Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
16977 If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
14020 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14026 Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
14022 The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]