12 ideas
| 17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
| 13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
| 17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
| 17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
| 17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
| 8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
| 8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
| 8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
| 8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
| 8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
| 8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
| 22254 | Economic capitalist liberty naturally leads to democratic political liberty [Novak] |