15 ideas
17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |