16 ideas
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
16668 | Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
3400 | Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi] |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |