Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tim Bayne, John Austin and Michael Devitt

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22 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
17771 How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
17770 Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
17766 Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
17768 Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
17769 Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
17767 The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
20930 The existence of law is one thing, its merits and demerits another [Austin,J]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]