Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tim Bayne, Karen Armstrong and Fred Dretske

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30 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In the Bible God changes his mind (repenting of creating humanity, in the Flood) [Armstrong,K]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
Monotheism introduced intolerance into religious thinking [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Around 800 BCE teachers superseded gods in India [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
There is virtually no sign of monotheism in the Pentateuch [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The idea that Jesus was God was only settled in the fourth century [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Faith is not just belief in propositions, but also putting trust in them [Armstrong,K]