Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tim Bayne, Richard Cartwright and Giordano Bruno

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
9786 Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
9784 A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14961 Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
14962 Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
17771 How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
17770 Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
17766 Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
17768 Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
17769 Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
17767 The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
9287 Bruno said that ancient Egyptian magic was the true religion [Bruno, by Yates]