Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tim Bayne, Simon Blackburn and Richard Tuck

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17 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]