Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tim Button, Diogenes (Apoll) and Robert Kirk

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia]
Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia]
Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia]