Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tom Clark, Churchland / Churchland and Francesco Orsi

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18 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]