Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tom Clark, Friedrich Nietzsche and Willard Quine

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941 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche]
Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche]
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche]
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche]
'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life [Nietzsche]
Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
All intelligent Romans were Epicureans [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche]
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche]
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche]
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche]
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche]
A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche]
You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche]
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche]
For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche]
Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche]
Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche]
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche]
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche]
Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins [Nietzsche]
Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated [Nietzsche]
Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview? [Nietzsche]
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche]
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche]
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche]
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche]
Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche]
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche]
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche]
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche]
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine]
To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine]
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine]
Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche]
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche]
Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche]
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche]
The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche]
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche]
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche]
Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche]
Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche]
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche]
Truth has had to be fought for, and normal life must be sacrificed to achieve it [Nietzsche]
One must never ask whether truth is useful [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche]
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche]
To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche]
Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche]
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine]
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Quine, by Linsky,B]
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine]
In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche]
Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche]
Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche]
Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche]
Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro]
Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein]
Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche]
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche]
Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche]
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche]
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche]
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche]
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche]
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche]
Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche]
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche]
Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche]
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche]
Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche]
Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche]
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine]
In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine]
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche]
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche]
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche]
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche]
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche]
The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche]
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin]
It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche]
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche]
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche]
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche]
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche]
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith]
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine]
There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche]
With protoplasm ½+½=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad [Nietzsche]
Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool [Nietzsche]
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche]
Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche]
Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool [Nietzsche]
A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche]
Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche]
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche]
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche]
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche]
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable' [Nietzsche]
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche]
'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force [Nietzsche]
Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche]
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche]
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche]
People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche]
Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away [Nietzsche]
Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are language [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine]
Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche]
Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche]
The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche]
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche]
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche]
The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche]
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche]
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche]
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
Philosophy grasps the limits of human reason, and values are beyond it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche]
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche]
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche]
Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche]
Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche]
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche]
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche]
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche]
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche]
The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche]
A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche]
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche]
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche]
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche]
Christianity is at war with the higher type of man, and excommunicates his basic instincts [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche]
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche]
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche]
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot]
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche]
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche]
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after [Nietzsche]
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We only really love children and work [Nietzsche]
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd [Nietzsche]
A living being is totally 'egoistic' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche]
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche]
I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche]
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche]
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche]
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche]
The only happiness is happiness with illusion [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche]
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche]
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche]
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche]
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche]
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche]
A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche]
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche]
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept [Nietzsche]
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche]
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche]
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche]
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche]
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche]
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche]
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche]
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche]
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche]
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche]
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche]
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche]
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche]
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche]
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche]
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche]
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche]
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche]
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche]
If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative [Nietzsche]
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche]
Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche]
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche]
To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche]
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche]
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche]
We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche]
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche]
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche]
Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom [Nietzsche]
If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche]
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche]
My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche]
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche]
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek]
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche]
Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche]
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche]
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche]
Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
It is absurd to think you can change your own essence, like a garment [Nietzsche]
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
To become what you are you must have no self-awareness [Nietzsche]
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche]
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal' [Nietzsche]
Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within [Nietzsche]
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche]
The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche]
The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche]
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche]
Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is above all a judging animal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche]
Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche]
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche]
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche]
Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche]
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche]
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche]
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche]
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche]
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche]
Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche]
To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche]
Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche]
Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche]
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche]
There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche]
One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche]
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche]
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche]
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche]
'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions [Nietzsche]
Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger [Nietzsche]
All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche]
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche]
Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution [Nietzsche]
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche]
Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances' [Nietzsche]
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough! [Nietzsche]
I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
A God who cures us of a head cold at the right moment is a total absurdity [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche]
Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable [Nietzsche]
It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter' [Nietzsche]
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche]
Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche]
I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct [Nietzsche]
By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche]
Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life? [Nietzsche]
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche]
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche]
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche]
Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche]
Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche]
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche]
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche]
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche]
Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure [Nietzsche]
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche]
How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche]
Christianity is a revolt of things crawling on the ground against elevated things [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The story in Genesis is the story of God's fear of science [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche]
The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche]
'Faith' means not wanting to know what is true [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The great lie of immortality destroys rationality and natural instinct [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
In heaven all the interesting men are missing [Nietzsche]
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche]
People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche]
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil [Nietzsche]