16 ideas
| 5435 | An interpreter of a text, because of wider knowledge, can understand it better than its author [Schleiermacher, by Mautner] |
| 22028 | Unity emerges from understanding particulars, so understanding is prior to seeing unity [Schleiermacher] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
| 4741 | A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |