Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tom Clark, Keith DeRose and George Bealer

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]