Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tom Clark, Michael Devitt and John Richardson

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
20349 Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson]
20351 Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson]
20350 Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
4741 A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
20356 Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
20366 A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]