Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tom Milsted, Barry Maund and Cheryl Misak

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]