213 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks] |
8988 | Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton] |
8987 | On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton] |
8992 | Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton] |
18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks] |
10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks] |
6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins] |
6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks] |
14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson] |
14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks] |
14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks] |
6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks] |
6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks] |
6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks] |
6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks] |
6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks] |
6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks] |
6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton] |
12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton] |
18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton] |
18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton] |
12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
8989 | The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton] |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
8990 | So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton] |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks] |
17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |