55 ideas
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
6040 | There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius] |
20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |