22 ideas
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |