35 ideas
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
16066 | Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
436 | A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
442 | Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus] |
440 | Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus] |
441 | Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
439 | God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus] |
443 | Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus] |